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Abstract This paper argues that English bare plurals (BPs) uniformly have a plain
existential semantics. Their generic/universal reading arises through a mechanism
of exhaustification modeled on Spector (2007). The sentence Some firemen are
tall triggers the implicature that only some firemen are tall. The variant Firemen
are tall triggers the implicature that this “only-some” implicature is false. The
universal reading of the BP thus arises through a “not-only-some” implicature. The
distribution of existential and generic readings of BPs is thus completely determined
by the availability of the “only-some” implicature of the corresponding indefinite,
without any need for a dedicated theory of the distribution of readings of BPs.
Keywords: bare plurals, scalar implicatures, plural morphology.
1 Introduction
English bare plurals (BPs) can have (at least) three readings: generic, existential
and Condoravdi’s (1997) reading.1 The distribution of these readings is constrained
by a variety of grammatical factors, such as predicate type (individual- versus
stage-level predicates), syntactic scope (within versus outside of VP), information
structure (focus versus topic), argument type (subject versus object), and so on.
Various authors have thus developed rich, dedicated theories of the distribution of
readings of English BPs, that make use of a number of covert operators together with
grammatical constraints on their scope, such as the generic operator, Chierchia’s
(1995) Derived Kind Predication, Heim’s (1988) Default Existential Closure, and so
on. This paper explores the hypothesis that there is actually no need for a dedicated
theory of English BPs: the distribution of the readings of a BP such as firemen is
∗ I would like to thank Gennaro Chierchia, Danny Fox, Raj Singh and Benjamin Spector for very
useful discussion on the material presented in this paper. This material was also presented at CGG 22
(Barcelona, February 2012) and at the LSALAA workshop (Université Paris 8, March 2012); I would
like to thank the audiences at those venues for valuable feed-back.
1 In this paper, I ignore the kind reading of BPs, which I take to be derived in a completely different
way than the three readings considered here (say, by having the BP denote a kind).
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entirely determined by the availability of the “only-some” implicature triggered by
the corresponding overt indefinite some firemen.
My starting point is the observation in Section 2 that the generic reading of BPs
behaves as the plurality inference triggered by English plural morphology relative to
embedding in environments of different monotonicity. This analogy calls for a unified
account. In Section 3, I review Spector’s (2007) pragma-semantics for the behavior
of the plurality inference and I trivially extend it to BPs. According to this proposal,
the plain meaning of a BP such as firemen is always just existential, whereby it is
equivalent to the corresponding indefinite some firemen. The BP’s universal/generic
reading arises through a mechanism of (double) strengthening, that works roughly
as follows. The corresponding indefinite some firemen triggers the “only-some”
(1st order) scalar implicature. The choice of the BP over the indefinite triggers the
“not-only-some” (2nd order) scalar implicature that this “only-some” implicature
is false. And this “not-only-some” scalar implicature yields the universal/generic
reading. This proposal predicts the availability of a BP’s universal/generic reading to
correlate with the availability of the “only-some” implicature of the corresponding
indefinite. In Section 4, I argue that this prediction is correct, as it amounts to a
corollary of Diesing’s (1992) framework, namely the fact that a BP can be interpreted
universally/generically only when it sits in a position where the corresponding
indefinite can be interpreted presuppositionally.
2 A parallelism between the plurality inference and the generic inference
In Subsection 2.1, I review from the literature the intriguing behavior of the plurality
inference triggered by English plural morphology relative to embedding in environ-
ments of different monotonicity. In Subsection 2.2, I then point out that the generic
reading of English BPs displays an analogous behavior. This observation calls for a
unified account, developed in Section 3.
2.1 The behavior of the plurality inference under embedding
Sentence (1a) with the plural indefinite some books triggers the plurality inference
(P-inference) that John bought more than one book.
(1) a. John bought some linguistic books.
b. John bought (at least) two linguistic books.
c. John bought a linguistic book.
Thus, sentence (1a) feels equivalent to sentence (1b) with the quantified indefinite (at
least) two books and both feel stronger than sentence (1c) with the singular indefinite
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a book. In fact, the latter sentence (1c) would feel true in a scenario where John
bought a single linguistic book, contrary to sentences (1a) and (1b).
It is well known that this P-inference behaves surprisingly in downward entailing
(DE) environments, such as the scope of negation or the restrictor and the nuclear
scope of the determiner no. Sentence (2a) with the plural indefinite2 embedded
under negation feels equivalent to sentence (2c) with the singular indefinite and
both feel stronger than sentence (2b) with a quantified indefinite. In fact, the latter
sentence (2b) would feel true in a scenario where John bought a single linguistic
book, contrary to the other two sentences (2a) and (2c).
(2) a. John didn’t buy any linguistic books.
b. John didn’t buy (at least) two linguistic books.
c. John didn’t buy a linguistic book.
Indeed, only sentence (2b) with the quantified indefinite can be felicitously continued
with but he did buy one as in (3b), while that continuation feels odd in the case of
sentences (2a) and (2c) with a plural and a singular indefinite, as in (3a) and (3c).
(3) a. #John didn’t buy linguistic books, but he did buy one.
b. John didn’t buy (at least) two linguistic books, but he did buy one.
c. #John didn’t buy a linguistic book, but he did buy one.
In conclusion, the P-inference disappears under negation, raising a composition-
ality puzzle: sentence (2a) does not mean the negation of sentence (1a), although
syntactically the former is indeed just the negation of the latter.
Spector (2007) adds the elegant observation that both the upward entailing
(UE) and DE behaviors are visible in the case of embedding in a non-monotonic
environment such as the scope of exactly one student, as illustrated in (4).
(4) a. Exactly one student solved some difficult problems.
b. Exactly one student solved (at least) two difficult problems.
c. Exactly one student solved a difficult problem.
Sentence (4a) with the plural indefinite differs from sentence (4c) with the singular
indefinite in the same respect that the unembedded sentence (1a) differs from (1c):
only (4c) but not (4a) would feel true in a scenario where the unique student who
solved difficult problems solved only one of them. In other words, the P-inference is
visible in the UE component of the non-monotonic meaning. Furthermore, sentence
(4a) with the plural indefinite differs from sentence (4b) with a quantified indefinite
2 From (1a) to (2a), I have switched from some to any because of the PPIness of the former, but I
consider the two items as equivalent for all intended purposes.
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in the same respect that the sentence (2a) differs from (2b): only (4b) but not (4a)
would feel true in a scenario where, besides the unique student who solved two or
more problems, there are a few more students who solved only one. In other words,
the P-inference is not visible in the DE component of the non-monotonic meaning.
2.2 The behavior of the generic inference under embedding
Sentence (5a) with the BP subject dogs triggers the inference that it is a general
property of dogs that they are intelligent. Let me call this inference the generic
inference (G-inference). Throughout this paper, I will ignore the issue of the quality
of the generic meaning, namely of the proper quantificational force of generics
and of their tolerance to exceptions. And I will thus treat generics as equivalent to
universals. The issue of the quality of the generic meaning indeed seems orthogonal
to the issue of its distribution, which is the focus of this paper.3
(5) a. Dogs are intelligent.
b. All dogs are intelligent.
c. Some dogs are intelligent.
With these qualifications, sentence (5a) is equivalent to the universally quantified
sentence (5b). Indeed, both sentences feel stronger than the existentially quantified
sentence (5c). In fact, the latter sentence (5c) would feel true in a scenario where
less than fifty percent of dogs are intelligent, contrary to (5a) and (5b).
It is well known that the G-inference behaves surprisingly in DE environments
(Fodor 1970; von Fintel 1997; Gajewski 2005). Sentence (6a) with the BP embedded
under negation feels equivalent to the existentially quantified sentence (6c) and both
feel stronger than the universally quantified sentence (6b). In fact, the latter sentence
(6b) would feel true in a scenario where half of the dogs are intelligent, contrary to
the other two sentences (6a) and (6c).
(6) a. It’s false that dogs are intelligent.
b. It’s false that all dogs are intelligent.
c. It’s false that some dogs are intelligent.
Indeed, only the universally quantified sentence (6b) can be felicitously continued
with but many of them are as in (7b), while that continuation feels odd in the case of
sentence (6a) with the BP and the existentially quantified sentence (6c), as in (7a)
3 The proposal put forward in Section 3, that BPs have a weak existential plain meaning and that their
generic meaning arises through double strengthening, might open the way to new approaches to the
sticky issues of generic BPs’ actual quantificational force and tolerance to exceptions, at least for
those cases where generic BPs behave differently than BPs bound by overt generic adverbs.
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and (7c). The triplet in (8) makes the same point for the DE environment provided
by the nuclear scope of few.4
(7) a. #It’s false that dogs are intelligent, but many of them are.
b. It’s false that all dogs are intelligent, but many of them are.
c. #It’s false that some dogs are intelligent, but many of them are.
(8) a. Pretty much in every country, at least half of the men are brave.
#But only in a few countries, men are brave.
b. Pretty much in every country, at least half of the men are brave.
But only in a few countries, all men are brave.
c. Pretty much in every country, at least half of the men are brave.
#But only in a few countries, some men are brave.
In conclusion, the G-inference disappears in DE environments, raising a composi-
tionality puzzle: sentence (6a) does not mean the negation of sentence (5a), although
syntactically the former is indeed just the negation of the latter.
Finally, let’s consider the case of embedding in non-monotonic environments,
illustrated in (9). Sentence (9a) with the BP differs from the existentially quantified
sentence (9c), since only the latter sentence would feel true in a scenario where only
half of the dogs turned out to be intelligent in the unique country mentioned here. In
other words, the G-inference is visible in the UE component of the non-monotonic
meaning. Furthermore, sentence (9a) with the BP differs from the universally
quantified sentence (9b), since only the latter sentence would feel true in a scenario
where there are a few more countries where half of the dogs are intelligent. In other
words, the G-inference is not visible in the DE component of the non-monotonic
meaning.
(9) a. In exactly one country, dogs are intelligent.
b. In exactly one country, all dogs are intelligent.
c. In exactly one country, some dogs are intelligent.
(10) a. In exactly one country, dogs are intelligent . . .
#And in two other countries dogs are sometimes intelligent.
b. In exactly one country, dogs are generally intelligent . . .
And in two other countries dogs are sometimes intelligent.
c. In exactly one country, dogs are sometimes intelligent . . .
#And in two other countries dogs are sometimes intelligent.
The latter intuition concerning the DE component of the non-monotonic meaning is
brought out in (10) by completing sentences (9) with the proper continuation.
4 The behavior of the G-inference in the case of the DE environment provided by the restrictor of
universal quantifiers is admittedly more tricky and I have to leave the issue open at the moment.
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2.3 Summary
The behavior (5)-(9) of the G-inference under embedding in environments of dif-
ferent monotonicity is analogous to the behavior (1)-(4) of the P-inference: the
inference is visible in UE environments and disappears in DE environments, with
both behaviors simultaneously displayed in the case of UE+DE=non-monotonic
environments. This analogy calls for a unified account.
3 A unified account: extending Spector (2007) from the P- to the G-inference
The behavior of the P-inference reviewed in Subsection 2.1 and the behavior of the
G-inference reviewed in Subsection 2.2 have been accounted for with different tools
in the literature. The behavior of the P-inference has been accounted for in terms of
a competition between singular and plural morphology, cast within the framework
of the theory of scalar implicatures (Spector 2007) or the closely related theory of
Maximize Presupposition (Sauerland 2003). On the contrary, the behavior of the
G-inference has traditionally been accounted for through a dedicated presupposition,
called the Homogeneity presupposition (Fodor 1970; von Fintel 1997; Gajewski
2005).
Yet, the analogy between the two behaviors calls for a unified account. Should
the implicature-based account for the P-inference be extended to the G-inference? Or
vice versa, should the presupposition-based account for the G-inference be extended
to the P-inference? In principle, both options are viable. In this Section, I develop
the former option: I review Spector’s (2007) implicature-based account for the
P-inference and straightforwardly extend it to the G-inference. In Section 4, I will
then argue in favor of this choice, by exploring in detail a peculiar prediction.
3.1 Preliminaries on scalar implicatures
Textbook semantics counterintuitively assumes sentence (11a) to be true in a scenario
where John solved all of the problems. Since seminal work by Grice (1975), this
assumption has been reconciled with intuitions as follows. Indeed, the plain meaning
of sentence (11a) is (11b), whereby it would be true in a scenario where John solved
all of the problems. Yet, the choice of the item some triggers the scalar implicature
that he did not solve all of them. And the sentence together with its implicature
effectively ends up equivalent to (11c), as desired.
(11) a. John solved some of the problems.
b. Joh solved at least some of the problems. = J(11a)K
c. John solved only some of the problems. = [[[(11a)]]]
388
No need for a dedicated theory of English bare plurals
The conjunction of the plain meaning of a sentence with its scalar implicatures
is called its strengthened meaning. I use the standard notation J·K for the plain
meaning5 and the notation [[[·]]] for the strengthened meaning (for a mnemonic, think
about your mobile phone: the more bars you have, the stronger the signal). In this
Subsection, I introduce background assumptions on the strengthened meaning.
As illustrated in (11), the strengthened meaning [[[ϕ]]] of a sentence ϕ can be
described as the plain meaning of the corresponding sentence with an overt only as-
sociating with the scalar item. Fox (2007) interprets this observation algorithmically,
as in (12): the strengthened meaning of a sentence is obtained by appending to its
LF a covert variant of only, called the exhaustivity operator and notated EXH.
(12) [[[ϕ]]] = JEXH ϕK
By (12), the theory of the strengthened meaning is reduced to the semantics of the
exhaustivity operator EXH or its overt counterpart only. Many approaches assume
that the exhaustivity operator EXH takes a prejacent proposition ϕ and does two
things, as in (13). First, it asserts the prejacent ϕ . Second, it negates a bunch of alter-
natives ψ , namely all the alternatives ψ in the set Exc(ϕ) of alternatives excludable
with respect to ϕ . Each conjunct ¬ψ in (13) is called a scalar implicature.
(13) JEXH(ϕ)K= JϕK ∧ ∧
ψ∈Exc(ϕ)¬JψK
The set Exc(ϕ) of excludable alternatives is usually defined in two steps. To start, the
set Alt(ϕ) of scalar alternatives of the prejacent ϕ is defined as the set of those LFs
that can be obtained from the target LF ϕ by replacing one or more scalar items in ϕ
with their Horn-mates. I will come back in Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 to the proper
definition of Horn-mateness. The set of excludable alternatives Exc(ϕ) is then
defined as the subset of those scalar alternatives ψ that can be negated consistently
with the prejacent ϕ (for instance, the alternatives ψ that asymmetrically entail ϕ).
Fox (2007) (building on Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002) and Spector (2007) modify
the framework just sketched, by replacing assumption (12) with the variant in (14),
that allows for an iterated exhaustivity operator.
(14) [[[ϕ]]] = JEXH(EXH(ϕ))K
As will become clear later on, the intuition behind the switch from (12) to (14) is as
follows: according to the classical assumption (12), it is only the plain meaning JψK
of the alternatives that plays a role in the computation of the strengthened meaning of
the prejacent; the revised assumption (14) allows instead the strengthened meaning
[[[ψ]]] of the alternatives to play a role as well.
5 As is common in the literature, I often drop J·K, sloppily using the same symbol ϕ for both an LF and
its plain meaning.
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As a matter of fact, the two definitions (12) and (14) turn out to be actually
equivalent in most cases. To illustrate, consider again the prejacent (11a), abbreviated
as SOME in (15a). Consider furthermore the two alternatives obtained by replacing
some with many and all, abbreviated as MANY and ALL in (15b) and (15c).
(15) a. SOME = John solved some of the problems.
b. MANY = John solved many of the problems.
c. ALL = John solved all of the problems.
Obviously, ALL asymmetrically entails MANY that in turn asymmetrically entails
SOME as in (16), where the arrows stand for asymmetric entailment. Furthermore,
the three items some, many, and all are usually assumed to be Horn-mates of each
other as depicted in (17), where the dotted lines stand for Horn-mateness.
(16) ALL

MANY

SOME
(17) ALL
MANY
SOME
By the original assumption (12), the strengthened meaning of the prejacent SOME
boils down to the conjunction of the prejacent SOME itself with the negation of its
alternative MANY as in (18) (the alternative ALL can be ignored, because its negation
is in turn entailed by the negation of the alternative MANY).
(18) [[[SOME]]] = EXH(SOME) = SOME∧¬MANY
By the revised assumption (14), we get the same result, but through the slightly
more cumbersome computation (19). In step (a), I have unpacked through (13)
the outer EXH: it asserts its prejacent EXH(SOME) and it negates the alternative
EXH(MANY) obtained by replacing some with the Horn-mate many (again, the
alternative EXH(ALL) can be ignored). In step (b), I have applied the definition (13)
once more (again ignoring the alternative ALL in the computation of EXH(SOME)
because it is irrelevant). Step (c) finally holds by logical equivalence.
(19) [[[SOME]]] = EXH
(
EXH(SOME)
) (a)
= EXH(SOME)∧¬EXH(MANY)
(b)
=
(
SOME∧¬MANY)∧¬(MANY∧¬ALL) (c)= SOME∧¬MANY
This example shows that the iteration of EXH in (14) has no effects in standard cases.
We need special patterns of entailment and Horn-mateness in order for iteration to
have an effect. One such case is described by Spector (2007), as reviewed below.
3.2 Spector’s implicature-based account for the P-inference
In Subsection 2.1, we have seen that the plural indefinite of sentence (20a) (ab-
breviated as PL) patterns as the singular indefinite of sentence (20c) (abbreviated
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as SING) in certain environments but as the quantified indefinite of sentence (20b)
(abbreviated as TWO) in certain other environments.
(20) a. PL = John bought some books.
b. TWO = John bought (at least) two books.
c. SING = John bought a book.
We have a clear understanding of the semantics and the pragmatics of the two
sentences SING and TWO. With respect to their semantics, we know that TWO
asymmetrically entails SING, as represented by the arrow in (21).
(21) TWO

SING
(22) TWO
SING
With respect to their pragmatics, we know that TWO is a scalar alternative of SING
as represented by the dotted line in (22). The latter assumption is needed in order
for SING to trigger the “only-one” implicature.
Now we want to fit sentence PL into the picture (21)-(22). Let’s start with its
semantics. The issue is tricky, as PL was found in Subsection 2.1 to behave as
TWO in UE environments but as SING in DE environments. Spector (2007) assumes
that plural morphology has a weak semantics equivalent to singular morphology,
whereby PL and SING are logically equivalent, as stated in (23b). Both are thus
asymmetrically entailed by TWO, as stated in (23a) and (23c).
(23) TWO
(a)

(c)
))
SING
(b)
// PLoo
(24) TWO
(a)
(c)
/
SING PL
(b)
Furthermore, Spector assumes that PL and SING are scalar alternatives, as stated
in (24b). Crucially, he assumes that, while SING is a scalar alternative of TWO as
repeated in (24a), PL is not an alternative of TWO, as represented by the broken
dotted line (24c). This is the only difference between SING and PL. Note that the
diagram in (24) requires Horn-mateness not to be transitive.
Spector shows that the strengthened meaning computed through assumptions
(13), (14), (23), and (24) accounts for the behavior of the P-inference under em-
bedding documented in Subsection 2.1. To start with the case of UE environments,
consider the unembedded sentence John bought some books, that was abbreviated
as PL in (20a). We want its strengthened meaning to say that John bought at least
two books. And that is indeed what we get, through the computation in (25). In step
(25a), I have used the assumption (14) that the strengthened meaning is computed
through an iterated exhaustivity operator. In step (25b), I have unpacked the outer
EXH using (13) into the prejacent EXH(PL) and the negation of its unique alternative
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EXH(SING). In step (25c), I have unpacked the inner EXH. The alternative SING is
not excludable relative to PL because it is equivalent to it, so that EXH(PL) boils down
to just PL. The alternative TWO is excludable relative to SING, so that EXH(SING)
boils down to SING∧¬TWO. By the equivalence in (25d), the strengthened meaning
says that John bought at least two books.
(25) [[[PL]]]
(a)
= EXH
(
EXH(PL)
) (b)
= EXH(PL)∧¬EXH(SING)
(c)
= PL∧¬(SING∧¬TWO) (d)= TWO
The intuition behind computation (25) can be made explicit as follows. The two
alternatives SING and PL have the same plain meaning, by (23). They only differ
because of their alternatives, by (24). In particular, SING is Horn-mate of TWO
and therefore triggers the uniqueness implicature that ¬TWO, contrary to PL. As
this is the only difference between SING and PL, the only reason why the speaker
has chosen PL over SING is that this uniqueness implicature that would have been
triggered by SING is false. And the plurality inference triggered by PL is due to the
negation of the uniqueness implicature that would have been triggered by SING.
So far, I have looked at UE environments. Nothing interesting happens in DE en-
vironments such as negation. Neither [not SING] nor [not PL] get strengthened. Thus,
the intuitive equivalence between these two sentences follows straightforwardly from
the equivalence of their plain meanings, postulated in (23b). In other words, prag-
matic effects are wiped out in DE environments, where we can therefore probe
into the actual plain semantics of singular and plural morphology. A computation
analogous to (25) derives the desired meaning for non-monotonic environments.
3.3 A straightforward extension of Spector’s account to the G-inference
In Subsection 2.2, we have seen that sentence BP in (26a) with a bare plural patterns
as the existentially quantified sentence SOME in (26b) in certain environments but as
the universally quantified sentence ALL in (26c) in certain other environments.
(26) a. BP = Dogs are intelligent.
b. SOME = Some dogs are intelligent.
c. ALL = All dogs are intelligent.
More precisely, we have seen that the behavior relative to embedding displayed by
the three sentences in (26) is formally analogous to the behavior displayed by the
three sentences in (20), through the formal correspondences in (27).
(27) BP←→ PL SOME←→ SING ALL←→ TWO
In Subsection 3.2, we have seen that the behavior under embedding of the three
sentences (20) follows from the pragma-semantic assumptions (23)-(24). Hence, the
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analogous behavior of the three sentences (26) follows from assumptions (28)-(29),
formally analogous to (23)-(24) through the correspondences in (27).
(28) ALL
(a)

(c)
))
SOME
(b)
// BPoo
(29) ALL
(a)
(c)
/
SOME BP
(b)
With respect to the semantics, sentence BP with the bare plural is logically equivalent
to the existential sentence SOME, by (28b). In other words, bare plurals always
contribute an existential plain meaning, no matter their readings. And both sentences
BP and SOME are asymmetrically entailed by the universally quantified sentence ALL,
as stated in (28a) and (28c). With respect to the pragmatics, SOME and ALL are of
course alternatives, as stated in (29a). Furthermore, BP and SOME are alternatives of
each other, as stated in (29b). The crucial difference between these two alternatives
is that BP, contrary to SOME, is not an alternative to ALL, as stated in (29c).
The facts observed in Subsection 2.2 now follow straightforwardly. The exis-
tentially quantified sentence SOME triggers the implicature that the corresponding
universally quantified sentence ALL is false, whereby the “only-some” inference.
Again through double strengthening, sentence BP triggers the “not-only-some” impli-
cature that the latter “only-some” implicature is false, whereby the generic/universal
reading. The details of the reasoning are spelled out in the computation in (30),
which is completely analogous to the one in (25).
(30) [[[BP]]] = EXH
(
EXH(BP)
)
= EXH(BP)∧¬EXH(SOME)
= BP∧¬(SOME∧¬ALL) = ALL
In DE environments, there are no implicatures, so that bare plurals reveal their plain
existential semantics (28b). Finally, a computation analogous to (30) derives the
desired meaning also for the case of embedding in non-monotonic environments.
4 Deriving a strengthened version of Diesing’s correlation
Assume that all arguments of a verb V are generated within VP, whereby they can
or must move out. Diesing (1992: Ch. 2 and 3) then correlates the readings of BPs
(generic or existential) and indefinites (presuppositional or non-presuppositional)
with their syntactic position (outside of or within VP) as in (31) and (32).
(31) A BP has a generic (existential) reading iff it is QRed outside of (left in situ
within) VP at LF.
(32) An indefinite has a presuppositional (non-presuppositional) reading iff it is
QRed outside of (left in situ within) VP at LF.
Since both (31) and (32) are double implications with the same right hand side, they
can be collapsed into the corollary (33).
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(33) A BP has a generic (existential) reading in a certain LF iff an indefinite in the
same position has a presuppositional (non-presuppositional) reading.
The distinction between presuppositional and non-presuppositional indefinites
invoked in (32) was first made by Milsark (1977), developed by Diesing (1992),
questioned by Reinhart (1995, 2006) and finally defended by von Fintel (1998).
Based on the latter reference, I take the distinction between the two types of indefi-
nites to be warranted. Yet, what is the presupposition triggered by presuppositional
indefinites? Diesing addresses this question in the following passage (pp. 59-60):
“In [the sentence SOME ghosts are in the pantry; the others are in the attic],
the determiner is stressed, and the presuppositional reading is most salient.
This sentence presupposes the existence of ghosts. If no ghosts exist, [. . . ]
its truth-value will be undefined. The presuppositional reading, unlike the
cardinal reading, can be paraphrased as a partitive: three of the ghosts.”
At the beginning of the passage, Diesing suggests that what makes some ghosts
presuppositional is the fact that it triggers the existential presupposition that “there
exist ghosts”. At the the end of the passage, she further clarifies her intuition,
suggesting that what makes the indefinite some ghosts presuppositional is the fact
that it is equivalent to the partitive some of the ghosts. But the presupposition
carried by the partitive is stronger than plain existential: it presupposes that the
relevant totality of ghosts denoted by the embedded definite is “given” or “familiar”.
Based on Diesing’s discussion in Chapter 3, I submit that this tension between
these two different construals of the presupposition triggered by presuppositional
indefinites should be resolved in favor of the latter: the indefinite some ghosts is
presuppositional because it is equivalent to the partitive some of the ghosts, whereby
the totality of ghosts is given or familiar.6
Plausibly, it is precisely the indefinites in partitive constructions such as some
of the ghosts that trigger the “only-some” scalar implicature that the corresponding
alternative all of the ghosts is false. Indeed, this “only-some” implicature concerns
the totality of the ghosts, and thus it makes no sense to derive this implicature if the
totality of ghosts is not a given discourse entity. Based on these considerations, I
thus restate Diesing’s generalization (33) somewhat more explicitly as in (34).
6 von Fintel (1998) instead resolves the tension between the two options (just an existential presupposi-
tion versus a partitive presupposition) in favor of the former: “Note another issue: the presupposition
that Diesing detects is not simply one of existence of entities that satisfy the common noun predicate
of the indefinite. Both of her examples that we have seen so far [. . . ] were described as involving
presupposed existence of a particular set of ghosts or cellists. I will assume that we have here an in-
teraction between a simple existence presupposition and the possibility of covert domain restriction”.
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(34) A BP has a generic (existential) reading in a certain LF iff an indefinite in the
same position triggers (does not trigger) the “only-some” implicature.
The extension (28)-(29) of Spector’s pragma-semantics to BPs straightforwardly
predicts Diesing’s correlation (34). Let me make this point explicit. According
to the semantics (28), a BP has a plain existential meaning. That will be its fi-
nal meaning, unless that plain meaning gets strengthened into a generic/universal
meaning. According to the pragmatics (29), this strengthening comes about through
the negation of the “only-some” implicature of the corresponding indefinite. Of
course, if the corresponding indefinite triggers no “only-some” implicature, then
there is nothing to negate and thus no strengthening of the existential meaning of BPs
into a generic/universal meaning. In other words, the proposed pragma-semantics
(28)-(29) straightforwardly predicts the generic reading of a BP to be parasitic on
the “only-some” implicature of the corresponding indefinite. And this prediction
is borne out, as stated in Diesing’s corollary (34). To substantiate this point, in
Subsection 4.1 I go through various well known cases that illustrate this correlation.
Actually, the extension (28)-(29) of Spector’s pragma-semantics to BPs derives a
stronger version of Diesing’s correlation (34) between BPs and overt indefinites. For
Diesing, that correlation is an epiphenomenon of the two generalizations (31) and
(32). And the latter two generalizations are independent of each other: the interpre-
tation mechanism for generic BPs is independent of the interpretation mechanism
for presuppositional indefinites, although both just happen to be sensitive to the
same LF landmarks (the left edge of VP). According to the proposal developed here
instead, the interpretation mechanism for generic BPs is completely parasitic on the
interpretation mechanism for overt indefinites, more precisely on their implicatures.
Thus, I predict not only that the availability of BPs’ generic/universal reading should
depend on the availability of the “only-some” implicature of indefinites, as stated in
(34), but also that the quality of that generic/universal reading should depend on the
quality of the “only-some” implicature triggered by the corresponding indefinite. In
Subsection 4.2, I provide some initial evidence that this stronger correlation holds,
by looking at Condoravdi’s (1997) third reading and its distribution.
4.1 Deriving Diesing’s correlation
The readings of BP subjects are well known to correlate with predicate type along the
individual-level versus stage-level predicate (ILP/SLP) distinction (Carlson 1977).
For instance, the BP subject dogs has a generic reading with the ILP carnivorous in
(35a) which is unavailable in the case of the SLP play in (35b).
(35) a. Dogs are carnivorous. GENERIC
b. Dogs were playing in the backyard. GENERIC
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Now consider the corresponding sentences with the BP dogs replaced with the overt
indefinite some dogs, as in (36). Out of the blue, (36a) triggers the “only-some”
implicature, while (36b) does not.
(36) a. Some dogs are carnivorous. ONLY-SOME
b. Some dogs were playing in the backyard. ONLY-SOME
The availability of the generic reading of the BP in (35) thus correlates with the
availability of the “only-some” implicature of the indefinite in (36), as stated in the
generalization (34) and predicted by the pragma-semantics in Subsection 3.3.
BP subjects of SLPs can be construed both existentially and generically. And
the available reading often depends on whether the BP is parsed into the focus or
the topic of the sentence (Wilkinson 1991). For instance, the BP subject firemen
of the SLP available in (37) can be construed both generically and existentially,
depending on whether the sentence is construed as being about firemen (37a) or
about people available at the information desk over there (37b). Analogously, the BP
subject typhoons of the habitual SLP arise in (38) can be construed both generically
and existentially, depending on whether the sentence is construed as being about
typhoons (40a) or about this part of the Pacific (40b).
(37) Firemen are usually available.
a. Talking about firemen. . . GENERIC
b. Talking about who is available at the information desk. . . GENERIC
(38) Typhoons arise in this part of the Pacific.
a. Talking about typhoons. . . GENERIC
b. Talking about things that happen in this part of the Pacific. . . GENERIC
(39) Some firemen are usually available.
a. Talking about firemen. . . ONLY-SOME
b. Talking about who is available at the information desk. . . ONLY-SOME
(40) Some typhoons arise in this part of the Pacific.
a. Talking about typhoons. . . ONLY-SOME
b. Talking about things that happen in this part of the Pacific. . . ONLY-SOME
In conformity with the generalization (34), the corresponding sentences (39)-(40)
with the BPs replaced by overt indefinites do or do not trigger the “only-some”
implicature, depending on how the topic of these sentences is construed.
The case of BP objects is well known to be different from that of BP subjects.
Both BP objects in (41a) and (41b) are interpreted existentially, although they occur
with a SLP and an ILP respectively. Yet, some objects of ILPs do require a generic
interpretation, as illustrated in (41c).
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(41) a. John bought books. GENERIC READING
b. John knows good lawyers. GENERIC READING
c. John hates/loves lawyers. GENERIC READING
Now consider the corresponding sentences with the BPs replaced with overt indef-
inites, as in (42). Out of the blue, (42c) triggers the “only-some” implicature that
John hates/loves only some lawyers, not all of them. The corresponding implicature
seems missing in the case of sentences (42a) and (42b).
(42) a. John bought some books. ONLY-SOME IMPLIC
b. John knows some good lawyers. ONLY-SOME IMPLIC
c. John hates/loves some lawyers. ONLY-SOME IMPLIC
Although the distribution of readings of BP objects is more intricate than that of BP
subjects, the pattern of readings again conforms to the generalization (34) and thus
follows from the pragma-semantics proposed in Subsection 3.3.
Existential BPs have been noticed to only take narrow scope relative to other
scope bearing elements (Carlson 1977).7 A classical illustration of this general-
ization is provided by sentence (43). The BP firemen can have both generic and
existential reading, as already recalled above for (37). Yet, the existential reading is
crucially condemned to have narrow scope relative to the universal adverb. Namely,
the sentence cannot mean that there are certain firemen that are usually available.
Usually, this generalization is captured by constraining the scope of whatever inter-
pretation mechanism is responsible for existential BPs. For instance, Diesing (1992)
derives existential BPs through an operation of Default Existential Closure (DEC),
and she therefore assumes it to have narrowest (i.e., VP) scope. Chierchia (1995)
derives existential BPs through Derived Kind Predication (DKP), which he assumes
is a “last-resort” type shifter, and is therefore only triggered in the most embedded
position. No such approach is available to me, as I have assumed in Subsection 3.3
that BPs have existential force on their own.
(43) Firemen are usually available.
Yet, consider the corresponding sentence (44) with the BP firemen replaced with an
overt indefinite some firemen. The indefinite can take both wide and narrow scope
7 Existential BPs have been documented to be able to take a scope narrower than what is possible for
plain indefinites (Carlson 1977). This finding is perfectly compatible with the pragma-semantics
proposed in Subsection 3.3. Furthermore, that proposal predicts the extreme narrow scope to
be possible for existential BPs but not for generic ones: if the BP can sit in a very embedded
position where an indefinite cannot sit, then it must receive its plain existential meaning, as there
is no alternative that could trigger a “only-some” implicature and thus strengthen the BP into a
generic/universal meaning.
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relative to the universal verb usually, as indicated by the paraphrases in (44a) and
(44b). The two paraphrases behave quite differently relative to the availability of the
“only-some” implicature, which is present for the wide-scope paraphrase (44a), not
for the narrow-scope paraphrase (44b).
(44) Some firemen are usually available.
a. Some firemen are such that they are usually available. ONLY-SOME
b. Usually, some firemen are available (at the information desk). ONLY-SOME
The restriction of existential BPs to the narrowest scope can thus be accounted as
follows within the pragma-semantics proposed in Subsection 3.3. The BP always
has an existential plain meaning, with no need for additional mechanisms such
as DEC or DKP. And BPs are allowed to take either wide or narrow scope, just
as any other indefinites. Crucially, it looks like existential BPs cannot take wide
scope because when they do, their plain existential meaning gets enriched into
a generic/universal one, that masks the plain existential reading. This is due to
the fact that the corresponding indefinite in a wide scope configuration like (44a)
triggers an “only-some” implicature that the BP negates, yielding a “not-only-some”
implicature. It is only in the narrow scope configuration that BPs are allowed
to display their plain existential meaning, due to the fact that the corresponding
indefinite does not trigger the “only-some” implicature from that position (44b), so
that no pragmatic strengthening happens.
As illustrated in (35), BP subjects of ILPs only get the generic reading. Yet, the
existential reading becomes surprisingly available when the BP is embedded under
another universal operator (Fox 1995). For instance, sentence (45) can be construed
as saying that for every man there are women related to him, so that the BP subject
women is interpreted existentially in the scope of the universal quantifier every man.
(45) Jewish women are related to every Jewish man. GENERIC
(46) Some jewish women are related to every Jewish man. ONLY-SOME
In conformity with generalization (34), the corresponding sentence (46) with the BP
Jewish women replaced by the indefinite some Jewish women triggers no implicature
when scoped underneath the universal quantifier every Jewish man.
Finally, there are some ILPs whose BP subjects manage to surprisingly carry the
existential reading (Fernald 2000). A couple of examples are provided in (47).
(47) a. Italians own this restaurant. GENERIC
b. Cities lie at the bottom of the mountains. GENERIC
Once more, consider the corresponding sentences with the BPs replaced by overt
indefinites, as in (48).
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(48) a. Some Italians own this restaurant. ONLY-SOME
b. Some cities lie at the bottom of the mountain. ONLY-SOME
There is clearly a way to construe these sentences (48) so that they trigger no “only-
some” implicature, so that the pattern (47)-(48) conforms to generalization (34) and
thus follows from the pragma-semantics proposed in Subsection 3.3.
4.2 Strengthening Diesing’s correlation
The BP subject students in (49a) is neither generic nor existential. Rather, it is
equivalent to the definite the students (Condoravdi 1997).
(49) In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the campus. . .
a. . . . Students were aware of this fact.
b. . . . Some students were aware of this fact.
Again, this interpretation is predicted by the pragma-semantics developed in Sub-
section 3.3. In fact, the reading predicted for this BP is existential (plain meaning)
plus the negation of the implicature (if any) triggered by some students in the corre-
sponding sentence (49b) (strengthening). Indeed, the indefinite in the latter sentence
(49b) does trigger an implicature, so that the BP of the target sentence (49a) is
correctly predicted not to have just a plain existential meaning. Crucially though, the
implicature triggered by the indefinite in (49b) is not that it is false that students in
general were aware of the ghost, so that the target sentence (49a) is not incorrectly
predicted to be strengthened into a generic meaning (“It is a general property of
students that they are/were aware of the ghost”). On the contrary, the implicature
triggered by the indefinite in (49b) says that it is false that all of the students on
campus were aware of the ghosts, so that the target sentence (49a) is predicted to
have the intended meaning, through the negation of the latter implicature.
This third reading of BPs detected by Condoravdi seems to be constrained in
subtle ways (Krifka, Pelletier, Carlson, ter Meulen, Link & Chierchia 1995). Indeed,
compare the BP students in (49a) with the BP lions in (50a). Despite the fact that the
two cases look analogous, the former can be interpreted as a definite (the students
on campus) while the latter cannot: sentence (50a) necessarily says something about
lions in general, not about the lions in the cage.
(50) In this cage there are lions and tigers.
a. Lions are sick.
b. #Some lions are sick.
This contrast follows from the pragma-semantics developed in Subsection 3.3. In
fact, the corresponding sentence (50b) with the BP lions replaced by the indefinite
399
Giorgio Magri
some lions feels degraded relative to the corresponding partitive Some of the lions are
sick. This case is thus different from (49b), which is just as fine as the corresponding
partitive Some of the students were aware. . . . I interpret the awkwardness of sentence
(50b) in the context considered as due to the fact that it triggers the scalar implicature
that not all lions (in the world) are sick, which does not fit with the topic of the
discourse, plausibly restricted to the lions in the cage. The corresponding BP lions
in (50a) is thus correctly predicted to be strengthened to a generic reading.
In Subsection 4.1, I have reviewed correlations between the distribution of
BP’s generic reading and the distribution of the “only-some” implicature triggered
by presuppositional indefinites. This distributional correlation can be captured in
a syntactic framework such as the one developed by Diesing, whereby the two
distributions are derived though independent mechanisms that happen to be sensitive
to the same LF landmarks. But this Subsection has argued that the correlation
between BPs and the “only-some” implicature is stronger: it concerns not only
the distribution of these readings but also their quality, namely whether they have
the quality of generics or of Condoravdi’s definites. The latter correlation does
not follow from Diesing’s system, while it is straightforwardly predicted by the
pragma-semantics of Subsection 3.3.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I have looked at two classes of facts. One class of facts concerns the
distribution of the readings of English BPs, which is sensitive to the monotonicity
of the environment (as reviewed in Subsection 2.2) as well as to a variety of other
structural and lexical properties (as reviewed in Section 4). The other class of facts
concerns the distribution of the “only-some” implicature triggered by indefinites,
which again is sensitive to the monotonicity of the environment (e.g., implicatures
disappear in DE environments) as well as to a variety of other structural and lexical
properties (as reviewed in Section 4). The two distributions seem to be highly
correlated – as already recognized by Diesing (1992), if we interpret her presuppo-
sitional indefinites as those that have a partitive meaning and therefore trigger the
“only-some” implicature. In this paper, I have offered no account for the distribution
of the “only-some” implicature triggered by indefinites. Yet, I have suggested that
the correlation between the two distributions should be taken at face value. And
I have thus derived the distribution of readings of BPs from the distribution of
partitive/presuppositional indefinites and their “only-some” implicature, through a
straightforward application of Spector’s (2007) double strengthening mechanism.
From this perspective, the crucial research question is how to explain the distribution
of the “only-some” implicature triggered by indefinites, while there is no need for a
dedicated theory of the distribution of readings of English BPs.
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